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Three case studies were examined (Westland, NATO Frigate
Replacement-90, and European Fighter Aircraft) which involved
defence procurement decision-making from 1985 to the present
by the government of the United Kingdom. These cases involved
three different outcomes in terms of national/multinational
production: 1) national, 2) UK/US, 3) UK/Europe and 4)
UK/Europe and US. Each case examined the technical, economic,
socio-political and military variables in an attempt to
explain and generalize about the future of defence procurement
in the United Kingdom. The case studies resulted in the
findings that technological, economic and political
considerations were of utmost importance in determining
whether the United Kingdom chose to produce a weapon system
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INTRODUCTION
A. THE MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION
Changes underway in Europe since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989 and the movement toward a single
integrated market planned for 1992, are having an impact on
defence1 budgets. As the perceived threats diminish so, too,
does defence procurement. In particular,the United States is
concerned with the transatlantic economic implications of
successful European armaments cooperation. Once largely an
American-dominated market, Europe is becoming increasingly
hostile to U.S. defence goods.
Of the European countries that have special significance
to the United States, the United Kingdom tops the list.
Consequently, determining how the United Kingdom is responding
to these new trends, especially regarding joint projects with
the United States, is of increasing importance to defence
planners.
In this thesis, I examine major weapons procurement since
1980 in which the United Kingdom had the following options: 1)
national, 2) joint UK/US, 3) joint UK/European and 4) joint
UK/Europe and US. For each case an attempt is made to
In this document, British spelling will be used where
applicable, specifically words like defence and programme.
1
determine what factor(s) play(ed) a role in the government's
ultimate decision. By examining three case studies in which
different outcomes prevailed, generalizations will be made as
to the future direction of British defence procurement.
B. DEFENCE PRODUCTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM2
The United Kingdom is one of Europe's most defence-
dependent societies in industrial terms. The goods required by
the military for transport, information collection and
transmission, for protection and destruction, are so varied
and dependent on expertise in so many technologies that "there
is more or less no industrial sector which does not or could
not contribute to the Defense Industrial Base. "3 Of Europe's
top 100 defence companies, British Aerospace PLC ranks first
with a turnover in excess of fifty-seven thousand million
dollars in 1988. GEC-Marconi ranks sixth and rounding out the
top ten is Rolls-Royce PLC in ninth place.4 (Westland plc,
2 For more information concerning Britain's defence
industry see the following:A. Trevor Taylor and Keith Hayward, The
UK Defence Industrial Base: Developments and Future Policy Options,
London, England: Brassey's,1989. B. William Walker and Philip
Gummet, "Britain and the European armaments market," International
Affairs, Vol. 65 No. 3, Summer 1989, pp.419-442 . C. Andrew
Moravcsik,"The European armaments industry at the crossroads,"
Survival, January/February 1990,pp.65-85 .
Taylor and Hayward, p.8.
4 Ian Curtis and Barbara Weedon,"Europe's Top 100 Defense
Companies," Defense & Foreign Affairs, January/February 1990, p.
18.
2
which will be the focus of the first case study, places
twenty-eighth.)
Defence accounts for eight to ten percent of the United
Kingdom's total manufacturing output. The United Kingdom's
indigenous equipment expenditure including collaborative
ventures is approximately 90%, compared to 95% for France and
98% for the United States.
5
Arms exportation is a big business in the United Kingdom.
Between 1970 and 1979, the UK ranked fourth in the world as an
exporter of major weapons. Table 1.1 shows the average
percentage of defence production exported between 1984 and
1989.
TABLE 1.1: DEFENCE PRODUCTION: AVERAGE % EXPORTED 1984-1989
France 45%
Federal Republic of Germany 10%
United Kingdom 33%
United States 10%
(Source: Unpublished UK Ministry of Defence estimates.)
Exports currently account for between one third and one half
of defence production.
6
5 Martyn Bittleston,"Co-operation or Competition? Defence
Procurement Options for the 1990s," Adelphi Papers 250, IISS,
Spring 1990, p. 10.
6 Trevor Taylor,"Wither Europe's Defense Industries,"
unpublished paper, p. 14.
3
The United Kingdom also ranks high in the world in terms
of research and development. As a percent of public research
and development devoted to defence, the UK's percentage is
rather high compared to other European states, with 55.6% in
1980.7 Only France comes close with an average of 30 per cent
of public R&D levoted to defence. In addition, the US, USSR,
and UK between them employ 90% to 95% of all engineers and
scientists engaged in military research and development.8
Although the UK has forces deployed throughout the world,
"its contribution to NATO accounts for more than 95% of its
defence budget."9 NATO allies account for the "single largest
share of the world defence industrial output." In 1987, the
UK's defence expenditure ranked third behind the United States
and Greece as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product among
NATO members at 4.9% or $29.5 billion.11
7 Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg (eds.), The
Structure of the defense industry, Great Britain: St. Martin's
Press, Inc., 1983, p. 345.
8 "Future Challenges to the European Defence Industrial
Base," paper prepared by British Aerospace PLC for CSIS Conference,
Brussels, Belgium, March 1989, p. 3.
9 Eurogroup, "Western Defense: The European Role in NATO,"
May 1988, p. 32.
10 Ibid.
11 Eurogroup, p. 32.
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When compared to her European allies and her ally across
the Atlantic, the United Kingdom stacks up as a major player
in the business of defence.
A survey of the literature suggests that despite interest
in collaboration, "nations still act independently to procure
the majority of their equipment."12 However, spiralling unit
costs, technological sophistication and periods of detente
provide evidence that procurement policies are being modified.
Statistics in early 1990 show that the United Kingdom has
just four out of thirty-nine major projects that are the
subject of intergovernment collaborative agreements.13
Seventy-five percent of the UK's defence equipment expenditure
is with its national industry. Budgeting pressures are
increasing. Consequently, the "UK is pursuing a policy of
competition.. to secure value for money.." 
14
The United Kingdom's national procurement policy has never
been clear. Instead, one must deduce the policy from
procurement practice, "which is not consistent but appears to
lean towards buying from home suppliers, even at some
additional cost.." Why is this the case? One answer may be
12 Bittleston, p. 4.
13 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1988, Vol. 2 CMD 344-
11 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1988), p. 17.
14 Bittleston, p. 36.
15 Ibid. p. 46.
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tradition. There are no guiding principles, merely a widely
shared wish to buy nationally if at all possible.
Economic necessity is driving the European nations to
collaborate. But the question remains--what percentage of the
United Kingdom's collaboration will be European as opposed to
transatlantic? The United Kingdom fears the loss of industrial
access to US technology if it should become too enthusiastic
about European collaboration. How the United Kingdom makes
this choice in the future is the major proposition examined in
this thesis.
Existing theory seems to imply that the United Kingdom,
given the choice between maintaining a national industrial
base or collaborating on major defence procurement projects,
will only maintain those segments of the defence industrial
base (engineering and electronics) in which she has an
existing competitive edge, and will collaborate with the
United States or Europe depending on which option provides the
most value for the money.
This thesis will test this theory by identifying various
conditions and variables that help to explain each decision,
with an eye to generalizing about future options.
C. RESEARCH DESIGN
This thesis utilizes the Focused Comparison approach which
has three phases: 1) design, 2) case studies and 3) assessing
the results of the case studies in order to elaborate the
6
initial theory stated in phase l.The research design generally
follows that put forth by Alexander George in "Case Studies
and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused
Comparison." 16
In each case, a set of general questions is asked which
first describe the outcome or dependent variables,"what" each
case is about. The answers to another set of questions, the
independent variables, provide the answers that will aid in
explaining (telling us "why") the British government made its
decision with respect to defence procurement.
Among the general questions to be asked are:
Ql) Who participated in the project?
Q2) What impact did the project have on the defence budget
in terms of magnitude?
Q3) What type and level of technology was utilized?
Q4) Which option was chosen and what were the specific
arrangements: l)UK, 2)UK/US , 3)UK/EUROPE or 4) UK/Europe and
US?
1. Cases
Three cases are chosen, each of which have a puzzle to
be solved. The outcome variable to be explained in the
Westland Case (Case #1) is why the government of the United
16 Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory
Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul
G. Lavren (ed.) Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and
Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1979, pp. 43-68.
7
Kingdom chose to help the helicopter manufacturer escape
bankruptcy by opting for a UK/US solution instead of a
UK/Europe solution featuring a European consortium. In this
case, the UK could not proceed without outside assistance.
In Case #2, the NATO Frigate Replacement (NFR-90)
project, the outcome variable to be explained is why, having
chosen to collaborate with European nations and the United
States, did the United Kingdom back out of the project which
led to its cancellation in January 1990, and revert to a
national procurement solution?
The third case (Case #3) to be studied involves the
European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). As its name implies, the
United Kingdom has chosen this collaborative project with
three of her European allies. Namely, West Germany, Italy, and
Spain. This case is ongoing.There is talk that, as a result of
unification, West Germany may pull out of the project. If this
happens, the United Kingdom will face a decision to cancel or
proceed--with or without the remaining partners. It has been
pointed out that the United Kingdom has the technology but not
the money to "go it alone,"17 but the project is of such
critical importance to the future of the United Kingdom's
aerospace industry that the money may be found. Based on the
findings of the first two cases, a forecast is made as to the
outcome of the third case, the EFA.
17 Ibid., p. 41.
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The analysis then turns to the examination of four
explanatory factors--technological, economical, socio-
political and military.
2. Technological factors
Q5 Was (Is) the United Kingdom's defence industry
self-sufficient in terms of technology needed?
This variable is used to determine whether the United
Kingdom would be able to follow through on a project without
the need for a partner(s) who could supply the necessary
technology.
Q6 Was (Is) arms exDortation of said equipment a
factor in partners chosen/not chosen?
This considers if the United Kingdom made or would
make their decision based on the ability to export at a later
date.
Q7 Did (Does) technology transfer enhance/detract from
US/European collaborative projects?
This variable considers whether protection
policies/trade barriers have been (or will be) a factor.
3. Economic Factors
Q8 Was (Is) the United Kingdom's industrial capability
threatened if the project was (is) not completed?
This variable looks at the extent to which the project
could be cancelled without a serious impact on the finances of
the company(ies) involved.
9
Q9 Was (Is) a decision made within a specified time-
frame to avoid an economic downturn?
This considers whether or not economic pressure forced
a decision in order to avert or forestall bankruptcy.
4. Socio-political factors
Q10 Was (Is) the United Kingdom's defence industry
guided by government guidelines?
This factor will examine to what extent government
policy is firmly stated and/or followed. One policy, Value for
Money, was established in 1982. This program, while committing
the government to nothing specific, was designed to create
"extensive and effective competition in the supply of defence
equipment."18 By making the Value for Money "the guiding
principle, it was hoped that military goals could still be
achieved, but within a tighter defence budget."19 Government
guidelines play a role in Britain's defence industry. Still
not content with the progress of the Value for Money program,
Michael Heseltine hired Peter Levene in 1985 as the Chief of
Defence Procurement for the United Kingdom in an attempt to
commercialize the United Kingdom's defence industry.
18 House of Commons Defence Committee, "The Procurement of
Major Defence Equipment," Fifth Report, CMD 431, June 1988, para.
91.
19 William Walker and Philip Gummet, "Britain and the
European armaments market," International Affairs, Vol. 65 No. 3,
Summer 1989, p. 421.
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The Levene Reforms rest on three principles: 1)
competitive tendering, 2) fixed-price contracts and 3)
budgetary control, i.e.--payment dependent on progress. 0 The
reforms, by and large, did not substantially change the
structure of the defence industry.
Qi Did (Does) the Prime Minister become involved?
This variable will examine Margaret Thatcher's
personal role in the decision to determine to what extent or
why she would be willing to intervene.
Q12 Was (Is) detente an issue?
This question will examine the government's perception
of the threat to Europe and how it affected/affects defence
procurement.
Q13 How important was NATO/US relations in determining
the outcome?
This variable will look at political pressures from
NATO and the United States as a determining factor.
5. Military factors
Q14 What was (is) the eguipment to be used for?
This factor will evaluate the importance of the
mission of the equipment to see if it was (is): a) vital for
securing British defence or b) necessary for replacing
existing stock.
20 Walker and Gummet, p. 421.
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Q15 Did (Does) military strategy(keeping control of
essential defence requirements) preclude collaboration with
the US or Europe?
This variable is intended to determine to what extent
the equipment was (is) exclusively for use in defending the
United Kingdom and therefore national procurement was deemed
the only option.
These variables were selected exclusively for this
thesis and include economic, political, military and
industrial factors.
6. Control variables
The cases to be studied have several variables that
remain(ed) constant throughout the time frame involved (1985-
1991), and therefore played a minimal role in each outcome.
1) The United Kingdom had(s) a Conservative Government
under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. As the head of her
government, consistency in terms of economic and defence
policies, to name just a few, should have minimized much
uncertainty regarding her political inclinations.
2) United Kingdom's membership in the European
Economic Community(EEC)--as a member in good standing since
the 1970s the United Kingdom did not have to consider the
impact of any defence decisions regarding the Community.
3) 1985 Official EEC announcement to develop a single
integrated market by 1992. It is well known that the UK has
12
been accused of being less than enthusiastic about the
prospects for 1992. However for the purposes of this analysis,
all signatories of the 1992 agreement are assumed to possess
equal enthusiasm for its success.
4) UK procurement policy known as Value for Money has
been(is) in effect. This policy sets up general guidelines
that the Ministry of Defence tries to follow in all cases,
considering short and long term impacts on defence procurement
decisions taken. Prior to the Value for Money program, the
MoD's relationship with Industry was characterized by loose
contractual specifications, work placed with preferred
suppliers, and payments made to suppliers under cost-plus
arrangements.
5) The Soviet Union was(is) ruled by President M.
Gorbachev. Gorbachev's foreign policy and vision of a "common
European home" has meant his desire to strengthen ties with
his neighbors, thereby alleviating some political tensions.
6) The United States was(is) governed by a Republican.
As in the case with Thatcher's government, consistency in
politics and a desire to protect the military-industrial
complex as a part of US national strategy contributed to
minimal fluctuations in defence policy.
7) The US/UK 'special relationship'. Winston Churchill
first coined this phrase in 1945 although "Britain and America
have never ceased to play important roles in each other's
13
history." 21 Anglo-American diplomatic relations span more
than two hundred years. Periods of closeness in the special
relationship have also been times of occasional mutual
exasperation, particularly when dealing with nuclear issues.
The United Kingdom has gained valuable technology from the
United States that might not otherwise have been the case, but
this does not mean she always gets what she wants, when she
wants it. The relationship is not a guarantee of special
favors and therefore of minimal importance to the analysis.
What makes the three cases chosen appropriate cases
for doing a focused comparison of defence procurement in the
United Kingdom? Clearly, each case represents equipment to be
used by the military. The Westland Case dealt with helicopter
procurement. The NATO Frigate project dealt with naval ship
procurement. The European Fighter Aircraft deals with fighter
plane procurement, all of which were intended for use by UK
forces (Army/Air Force, Navy, and Air Force respectively.)
The Westland Affair was chosen because its publicity
and attention raised questions within the government of the
United Kingdom regarding governmental intervention in defence
procurement that are still of concern today. Additionally,
Westland involves the manufacture of helicopters by the only
company within the United Kingdom capable of such.
21 Henry A. Kissinger, "Reflections on a Partnership:
British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy,"
International Affairs, (Autumn 1982), p. 571.
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The NATO Frigate Replacement (NFR-90) project was
chosen as a case study that involved multiple nations and
defence weapons systems that was touted as NATO's (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) largest successful collaborative
naval effort. Why, then, did it fail? The answer to this key
question could provide vital clues for the EFA and future NATO
collaborative programs.
The final case chosen, the European Fighter Aircraft
(EFA), is intriguing. The project initially involved France,
England, West Germany, Italy and Spain. After France withdrew,
analysts wondered how long or if the other nations could
continue. The United Kingdom's aerospace industry is in
critical need of succeeding with the EFA in order to prove
that the Europeans can compete with the Americans when it
comes to aerospace. In this case, there is also interest in
finding out how much, if any, technology will be supplied by
US contractors.
The European Fighter Aircraft has a chance of becoming
the most costly joint European project ever. The success or
failure of this project has more than a little interest to US
defence planners and industry since it could portend things to
come.
The next chapter turns to Case #1: The Westland
Affair. By answering fifteen specific questions I will unlock
the key to the first puzzle--Why the government of the United
15
Kingdom chose to help the helicopter manufacturer escape
bankruptcy with a US solution.
16
II. THE WESTLAND AFFAIR
"Westland shareholders yesterday [12 February 1986]
approved by more than two to one the controversial rescue
package agreed by the board with Sikorsky of the United
States and Fiat.... "
"The decision should end the bitter conflict over
Westland's future which has rockeC the Government over the
past two months."2
2
So ended what became known as the "Westland Affair", a
decision by the United Kingdom to build its next helicopter
with the United States and not Europe.
In the fall of 1985, Westland plc, the United Kingdom's
only helicopter manufacturer, faced bankruptcy; Westland's
financial status was bleak and had been for years. The
government of the United Kingdom was aware of this, but within
the halls of the Ministry of Defence, opinions differed about
what, if any actions to take to rescue the company. Westland
was, as far as helicopters go, a small player in a bigger
game.
By the time a decision was reached the following February,
two of Prime Minister Thatcher's top ministers had resigned.
The political drama of that winter presented a conflict
22 Patience Wheatcroft, "Strong Westland majority backs
Sikorsky," The London Times, 13 February 1986, p. 1 Col. 1.
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between free market and interventionist industrial policies
that was not resolved by the close of the case. In fact, the
question remains: "were the United Kingdom's best interests
ever a serious consideration in the Westland Affair?"
23
Whether governments should steer industrial policy and to
what extent was not resolved in the case of Westland. As the
tensions mounted between interventionists who wanted to
preserve the United Kingdom's defence industry through a
European dimension, and the free market proponents who desired
a competitive procurement policy, one point was clear: in
public, "the Government took the view that the defence
interests at stake were not sufficient to justify a public
sector rescue operation, " 24 but in private, Prime Minister
Thatcher and her Secretary of State for Trade and Industry
Leon Brittan, took measures to ensure Westland's survival was
achieved by the U.S. Sikorsky-Fiat rescue bid.
In the questions that follow, the case and its outcome are
described.
01 Who participated in the project?
The countries and their defence industries involved in the
Westland rescue bid included two opposing consortiums--one
23 Donald E. Fink, "The Westland Affair," Aviation Week
and Space Technology, 24 February 1986, p. 13.
24 House of Commons Defence Committee Fourth Report
Session 1985-86, "Westland plc: The Government's Decision-
Making," CMD 519, para. 24.
18
consisting of European companies and the other made up of one
American firm tied with an Italian firm.25
The European consortium which was put together by the
efforts of Michael Heseltine, the United Kingdom's Secretary
of State for Defence, consisted of Aerospatiale of France, MBB
of Germany and Agusta of Italy-later joined by British
Aerospace and General Electric of the United Kingdom.
26
An alternate rescue bid was first offered by the American
United Technologies Corporation (UTC), the parent company of
Sikorsky Aircraft. [Westland had been building Sikorsky
helicopters under license since the mid 1940s.] UTC's rescue
bid was later joined by Fiat of Italy in a deal that has
"always been one of the murkiest areas of the Westland
Affair.,27
02 What impact did the project have on the def-ence budget
in terms of its magnitude?
Westland, as the United Kingdom's only helicopter
manufacturer was considered a major defence contractor to the
25 One other rescue bid was proposed prior to Sikorsky's
initial proposal by British millionaire Alan Bris-ow. He
withdrew his bid in June 1985. For further detail see Magnus
Linklater and David Leigh, Not With Honour The inside story of
the Westland Scandal, (London: Sphere Books Ltd, 1986), p. 40.
26 Lawrence Freedman, "The case of Westland and the bias
to Europe," International Affairs, Vol. 63 No. 1, Winter 1986-
87, p. 1.
2' Linklater and Leigh, p. 77.
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British government.28 In 1977, Westland ranked eighth out of
twenty in the category of largest arms producers in the United
Kingdom.2
By late 1985, however, Westland's debts were higher than
-' narket value of the shareholders' stock and the firm had
a complete lack of orders for the period 1986-1990.30
After the rescue bid was accepted in February 1986,
Westland received an order from the Ministry of Defence for
seven Sea King helicopters at a cost of twenty-five million
pounds.31 When this figure is compared with the 1986-87
defence procurement budget in Table 2.1, it is evident that
the Westland helicopter company had a minimal role in the
nation's 2,673 million air equipment budget despite its
position as the only helicopter manufacturer in the United
Kingdom.
28 Ball and Leitenberg, p. 350.
2 Ibid., p. 352.
Pauline Creasey, "European Defence Firms in Cooperation
Agreements," in Pauline Creasey & Simon May (eds.), The
European Armaments Market and Procurement Cooperation (London:
The Macmillan Press, LTD, 1988), p. 127.
31 Westland announces 25m Sea King order from MoD,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 September 1986, p. 444.
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TABLE 2.1: DIVISION OF UK PROCUREMENT PROGRAMME 1986-87
Category Development (%) Production (%)
Air Equipment 690 Million 8% 2,673 M 30%
General Support 470 Million 5% 519 M 6%
Research 398 Million 4%
Sea Equipment 476 Million 5% 2,110 M 23%
Land Equipment 303 Million 3% 1,409 M 16%
(Prices reflect British currency in millions of pounds.
Source: Mark Daly, "British defenca spending starts to
decline," Jane's Defence Weekly, 17 May 1986, p. 866.)
03 What type and level of technology was utilized?
Westland's record as designer and innovator of helicopters
was not impressive--its more successful products had been
built under licence from Sikorsky, the helicopter subsidiary
of United Technologies Corporation.. 32
The House of Commons Defence Committee held an inquiry
into the Westland Affair in an attempt to determine the
ramifications to the United Kingdom's helicopter industry if
Westland went into receivership. During this time, key
individuals were questioned, among them, Sikorsky's Vice
President.
Mr. Paul, Senior Vice President for Defense and Space
Systems, UTC, explained to the House of Commons Defence
Committee (HCDC) that Westland must have a product in order to
32 Creasey, p. 127.
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survive and therefore had "chosen to secure a Black Hawk
license."33 [Black Hawk is a Sikorsky designed helicopter.)
Sir John Cuckney, Westland's chairman, told the HCDC that
manufacturing Black Hawks meant work in advance design and
tremendous opportunities for the engineering department
working with composite materials. His people would get "a lot
of the specific design work" on Sikorsky's LX helicopter.3
In addition to the Black Hawk, Westland would gain "non-
helicopter business to help [their) technology and aerospace
divisions."35 Cuckney concluded his appearance by
explaining that the UTC-Fiat rescue meant that sixty per cent
of the Black Hawk would be British built.36 Two-thirds of the
Sikorsky-Fiat offer involved engineering work "of a quality
that would keep Westland's design and engineering teams
intact." 
37
The European consortium offer involved work on three
helicopters--the EHI01, the NH-90, and the proposed PAH2/A-129
merger( PAH2 and A-129 were separate battlefield helicopters
33 Humphrey Atkins, "Defence Implications of the future
of Westland plc: minutes of evidence and appendices: Dec. 18,1985-Apr. 16, 1986, House of Commons Defence Committee 169, p.
272.
3 Ibid., p. 80.
5 Ibid., p. 77.
36 Ibid., p. 245.
37 Creasey, p. 138.
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that were being considered for a merger), with guaranteed
sales over the next ten to fifteen years. While this offer
appeared better for Westland on the surface because it
involved three helicopters (as opposed to the offer of Black
Hawk), the order depended on savings from a common European
procurement policy proposed by the British MoD. Westland
sought clarification of whether the work was truly guaranteed. 3
The European consortium did not offer any new projects.
The consortium argued that "the UTC-Fiat proposal was a
high-risk option, putting the benefits of European cooperation
at risk in return for the uncertain promise of exports of
Black Hawk."
39
Westland weighed the bids and accepted the Sikorsky-Fiat
offer. Consequently, "following agreement of full partnership
with United Technologies, Westland received US State
Department approval to produce a version of the Sikorsky Black
Hawk designated WS70."4
04 Which oDtion was chosen and what were the specific
arrangements: 1)UK. 2)UK/US. 3)UK/Eurooe or 4)UK/EuroDe and
US?
"The cloudiness (uncertainty about 'guaranteed work') of
the bid by the European consortium and the doubt about the
3 Creasey, pp. 137-138.
39 Freedman, p. 13.
Jane's All The World's Aircraft 1987-1988, (London:
Jane's Publishing Company, 1988), p. 187.
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durability of the defence ministers' long-term intentions
to seek a common procurement policy, led to acceptance of
the revised Sikorsky-Fiat proposals at the second meeting
of Westland shareholders [on 12 February 1986.]"
4
The financial proposals of the two bidders were similar as
Table 2.2 shows.
TABLE 2.2: THE FINANCIAL PROPOSALS OF THE TWO BIDDERS
Financial details (millions of pounds) Sikorsky Europe
New share capital subscribed by
potential partners 40.8 36.8
New share capital subscribed by
existing shareholders 35.5 13
Conversion of bank debt into
preference share capital, net of sales 23 23
Total package 80 75
(Prices based on 28 January 1986 and refer to Sikorsky's
revised offer. Source: Morgan G~enfell & Company (adviser to
UTC) and Lloyds Merchant Bank.)
The commercial packages, to be negotiated in detail after
legal acceptance, were quite different and Westland's future
rested on them.
41 Creasey. p. 139. [Sikorsky revised its December
proposal as a result of the European bid. The revisions
included more capital injection and labor.]
42 Creasey, p. 136.
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Westland needed a saleable product to keep it operating
through the 1990s. Sikorsky provided the Black Hawk license,
proposing sales of 150 helicopters to third-country
markets.
43
The exact terms of the deal were not disclosed. According
to Sir Cuckney, who asked the HCDC if he could answer their
questions regarding this matter in private, the arrangement
with Sikorsky was "commercially sensitive and price
sensitive.""
The Westland Board set aside three million pounds for a
WS70 demonstrator, to be assembled from a Sikorsky kit. The
demonstrator flew for the first time on 1 April 1987.45
In the fall of 1986, Sikorsky's President Mr. Zincone said
the process was being sorted out regarding Westland's Black
Hawk sales--some areas would be dealt solely by Westland and
others would be shared between the partners. 6
In the same interview, Mr. Zincone described future re-
engining of the Black Hawk with the "Rolls-Royce RTM 322
[making it] a super hard-hitting combination and..far more of
a UK product."4
43 Ibid., p. 138.
Atkins, "Defence Implications..," p. 239.
Jane's
6 "Westland announces..," p. 444.
47 Ibid.
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Table 2.3 shows the competing bids in terms of capital
injection and short/long term prospects. Clearly, the Black
Hawk weighed heavily in Westland's desire for the Sikorsky
bid.
TABLE 2.3: OPPOSING RESCUE BIDS
Sikorsky Europe
Capital injection: 74 Million 73.1M
Short term/Man hours: 2 Million over 5yrs 1.8 Mil over 3
Long term/Projects: Develop and Nothing new
manufacture
Black Hawk
(Source: Lawrence Freedman, "The case of Westland and the Bias
to Europe," International Affairs, Vol. 63 No.1, Winter 1986-
8 7
,p.13.)
Having now described what the Westland Affair entailed,
who was involved and the outcome decided, it is time to turn
to some of the factors that will explain why the government of
the United Kingdom decided in favor of a US solution.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
05 Was the United Kinadom's defence industry self-
sufficient in terms of technology needed?
In 1986, Westland's world market share of military sales
of helicopters in service was 3.5%. In Europe it ranked third
26
behind France and Italy. In the United States, Sikorsky's
shares was 7.1%, second only to Bell.
48
Westland entered the helicopter industry in 1947 when it
acquired a license from Sikorsky to build the S-51 (renamed
Dragonfly.) Technical association with Sikorsky continues to
this day. In total, Westland had produced and sold more than
1200 Sikorsky-designed helicopters to countries throughout the
world by 1986.49
Westland's troubles stemmed from a failed commercial
helicopter venture, the W30 and a change in policy which
allowed "manufacture in advance of orders." 50 The W30 was a
failure. It was designed to be the United Kingdom's first
"made from scratch" purely civilian helicopter. Market
research had shown that the world civil market was going to
grow, yet W30 production was a losing proposition. What few
W30s were sold proved problematic to their owners. The
helicopters had a limited payload and inferior speed, among
other problems. To compound Westland's troubles, several W30s
crashed due to mechanical failure. Sales henceforth were
difficult and the real troubles began. The helicopter company
needed capital and technology to remain self-sufficient. If
4 Creasey, p. 129.
49 Atkins, p. 271.
50 "Westland W30 development a 'huge mistake'," Jane's
Defence Weekly, 18 January 1986, p. 45.
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Westland failed to attract a partner, the United Kingdom's
sole helicopter manufacturing capability would have ceased.
The United Kingdom's defence industry was not self-
sufficient in terms of helicopter production if Westland
failed. According to the MoD, "the United Kingdom was going to
be able to purchase from NATO sources the helicopters that
British forces needed.",51 If Westland went bankrupt, the
Ministry of Defence would be forced to rely on outside
sources.
06 Was arms exportation of equipment a factor in partners
chosen/not chosen?
The answer is affirmative. According to Sir Cuckney, "the
Black Hawk (was] important, but (his company] believed the
export potential for it (made] the deal attractive on its
own." 52 When asked if he saw sales to third countries of
British-built Black Hawks, Mr. Paul replied, "Absolutely."
53
Arms exportation was evidently of critical importance in
Westland's decision to choose Sikorsky.
07 Did technology transfer enhance/detract from
US/European collaborative projects?
The answer to this question depended upon whom was asked.
The European consortium judged that "Sikorsky's association
51 HCDC, "Government's Decision-Making," para. 31.
52 Atkins, p. 241.
53 Ibid., p. 275.
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with Westland [would] enable it to bring its technical and
marketing expertise to bear on European military and civil
helicopter programs. -54 Technology transfer coming from
Sikorsky added to Westland's desire for their rescue bid.
This meant that the European rescue bid, which offered little
in the way of new technologies, had less of a chance to
succeed. Westland stood to gain technologically from
Sikorsky's participation.
The United States government viewed Sikorsky's
participation in Westland as a situation which could raise
technology transfer questions. 55 On the positive side, it
raised cooperative transatlantic military program
possibilities.
The full significance of the UTC-Fiat participation in
Westland regarding technology transfer will not *be apparent
for years to come. Suffice it to say Westland was enhanced by
U.S. collaboration, particuldrly when compared to the European
alternative which offered little in the way of guaranteed work
or technology.
B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
08 Was the United Kingdom's industrial capability
threatened if the project was not completed?
54 Fink, p. 13.
Ibid.
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The effect Westland's failure would have had on the United
Kingdom's industrial capability had Westland gone bankrupt can
not be known since the U.S. rescue bid kept the company
solvent. However, competing opinions within Thatcher's
government kept this case in the public's view. The issue of
the United Kingdom's future industrial helicopter capability
was of significance in the Westland affair.
UK Secretary of Defence Heseltine sponsored the European
consortium's counter proposal because he felt threatened by
"another advance for American technological hegemony."
5 6
Heseltine's resignation came in part because of his refusal to
be silenced "over an issue which he believed had profound
implications for 'defence procurement and the United Kingdom's
future as a technologically advanced country'." 57
UK Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Leon Brittan,
held the opposing view which incidentally was never made
public. It was his belief that "..it [was] by no means certain
that letting the company go bankrupt would be damaging to
essential national interests.." 58 The Prime Minister had that
paragraph deleted from an official inquiry into a smear
campaign between Heseltine and Brittan.
56 "Westland sets the Tories spinning," The
Economist,4 January 1986, p. 43.
57 Linklater and Leigh, p. 150.
58 Ibid., p. 198.
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Whether Thatcher consciously abandoned her official policy
of impartiality remained unclear--but she took active steps
behind the scenes to undermine Heseltine's public advocacy of
the European option.
59
09 Was a decision made within a specified time-frame to
avoid an economic downturn?
Time was a key factor in the Westland affair. By December
6th 1985, the government of the United Kingdom was concerned
that Westland could go into receivership without quick
financial reconstruction.6 By this time, the government was
placed in a difficult situation. With Heseltine's
encouragement, the National armaments directors (NADs) had
agreed to come up with a European solution to save Westland.
The government had to decide how to respond to NAD; if the
government did not drop the NAD proposal, Westland would not
have a choice and the U.S. option would be nixed.
61
A deal had to be signed before Westland would be trading
fraudulently and insolvently. The financial struggle for
Westland became frenzied. The details of what actually
happened "suggest(ed] that the behavior of the City of London
59 Ian Davidson, "The Westland Affair: policy issues,
The World Today, Vol. 42 No. 3, March 1986, p. 37.
6 HCDC, "Government's Decision-Making," para. 73.
61 Ibid., para. 76.
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match[ed] anything that had taken place in the corridors of
Whitehall.
" 62
Economic disaster was avoided, but in doing so there was
a definite bias toward selecting the UTC-Fiat option.
C. SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS
010 Was the defence industry of the United Kingdom guided
by government guidelines?
The government's policy regarding defence industry was
put into question during the Westland affair, but was never
satisfactorily determined. It appears that there were several
policies with respect to defence procurement, notably, in the
case of Westland, the 1978 "Declaration of Principles."
The adoption of the Declaration of Principles committed
four European governments--France, the FRG, Italy and the UK
to work together to develop and produce new military
helicopters. The idea was to pursue common policies with
industry in order to increase standardization and
interoperability by rationalizing the industry. The goal was
to reduce the number of helicopter types used within the
Atlantic Alliance. The spirit of the declaration was
European.
6 Linklater and Leigh, p. 174. (See Chs. 13 & 14 for
detailed accounts of the stock exchange phenomena that took
place re: Westland.)
63 Creasey, p. 130. (See Appendix 1 of Atkin's
"Defence implications...," for the 1978 document.)
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The defence committee investigating the Westland case
wanted to know how important the declaration agreement had
been in producing collaboration in terms of helicopter
development. Michael Heseltine said it had been "extremely
successful." 64
The government, on the other hand, said that "the
collaborative projects launched in pursuance of the
Declaration of Principles [had] not taken the precise form
originally envisaged.."65 This statement was made in response
to the Westland case--specifically the U.S. rescue. The
objective of rationalizing European production of helicopter
types was not being met.
Prime Minister Thatcher professed a policy of impartiality
regarding government involvement in the defence industry. As
it turned out, it was hard for her to sustain the argument
that the United Kingdom's defence procurement decisions should
be a matter of indifference to the British government.6
At issue in the Westland affair was the kind of
protectionism in the defence industry that was expensive to
taxpayers and could give armed forces inferior equipment. The
government ended up "paying lip-service to the concept of
market forces and shareholder democracy...at the same time it
Atkins, p. 7.
65 CMD 9916, "Government's response to Third and
Fourth Reports HC 518/519," October 1986, para. 14.
Davidson, p. 38.
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was playing a strongly interventionist role to ensure that the
'right' decision, in the opinion of a small number of people,
was eventually taken." 67
011 Did the Prime Minister become involved?
There is no doubt that Prime Minister Thatcher was deeply
involved in the Westland decision, despite the fact that the
Government had reached the collective view that "the national
interest did not demand a public sector rescue of
Westland...it was for the Company itself to decide."6 Her
involvement was intense--she called many of the shots which
went contrary to her stated policy of impartiality.
Prime Minister Thatcher worked closely with her minister
of Trade and Industry. Together, they managed to block many of
Heseltine's moves. For example,Thatcher had decided to reject
the recommendations from NAD, but since a minority of her
Ministers felt strongly about it, she called for an Economic
Sub-Committee. She told the House that at the economic meeting
on 9 December 1985 it had been concluded that, "unless a
viable European package ..was in place by 4.00 p.m. on 13
December--the Government would make it clear that the country
would not be bound by the recommendation of the National
Armaments Directors." 6 The Lower House concluded, "if those
67 Linklater and Leigh, p. 206.
HCDC, "Government's Decision-Making, para. 102.
69 Ibid., para. 76.
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words (were] to be taken literally, the condition imposed by
the Government..was impossible to fulfill."70 Westland was not
due to have a Board meeting until late that evening!
Thatcher's decision to tell the Westland Company that
NAD's recommendation would lapse at 4pm on 13 December was an
invitation not to advance the company's Board meeting, thus
letting the recommendation lapse.
Heseltine had words to say about her involvement regarding
the 9 December meeting. He said the "meeting ended with a
clear statement that we would meet again on Friday [the 13th]
at 3.00 p.m...It was a devastating surprise when (the Cabinet
Office] subsequently cancelled the meeting."71
Thatcher went on to tell the House that no such meeting
was taken or recorded. She managed to squelch the NAD
recommendation and Heseltine at the same time.
Thatcher also used her authority to deny Heseltine the
right to put the Westland case before the Cabinet. In
addition, "Mrs. Thatcher personally oversaw the response to
each move made by her dissident defence secretary."
Prime Minister Thatcher was a close friend of Sir Cuckney,
Westland's director. At one stage in the scandal, she made a
70 Ibid., para. 77.
71 Ibid., para. 80.
72 "Heseltine stakes his shirt on a different future,"
The Economist, January 11, 1986, p. 47.
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significant move to support Cuckney which contradicted and
humiliated Heseltine's authority." Her relationship with
Cuckney helps to explain why she got personally involved. By
the time the case was over, two of her top ministers had
resigned. Thatcher's self-esteem was bound up with the fate of
Cuckney's helicopter company.
The Prime Minister's personal involvement in the Westland
affair was reportedly damaging to her government. As one
critic pointed out, her involvement "would reveal a Prime
Minister who [had) always stressed the importance of being
open with the British people, presiding over an affair where
concealment rather than candor was the guiding force."75
012 Was detente an issue?
The effect that East-West detente may have had on the
United Kingdom's defence procurement in 1985 was negligible.
In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev had just recently come
into power. In the United States, President Reagan's military
build up continued apace. Unlike the other two cases examined
in this thesis, the Westland affair was not severely impacted
by detente. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was
alive and well in 1985.
Linklater and Leigh, p. 121.
Ibid., p. 149.
75 Ibid., p. 4.
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What did have an impact on the Westland crisis was the
time in which it happened--at a time when the United Kingdom's
defence effort was starting to be squeezed at the margins.
76
By 1985, defence procurement decisions had to be critically
scrutinized and justified. No longer were all projects
affordable nor fundable. Modernization costs for equipment had
escalated and were continuing to rise. The time had come to
shave down force sizes and weapon procurement.
013 How important were NATO/US relations in determining
the outcome?
Internal political pressures had more to do with the
Westland case than NATO or US reaction, but the Westland
affair was far reaching. As shown, the government of the
United Kingdom had to deal with NAD's proposal in such a
manner as to give the American option a chance.
Since Westland's financial troubles were a UK problem,
Thatcher could afford to be less concerned about external
reactions. She managed to suppress NAD's proposal without a
major political backlash as seen in the last question. She put
the onus on Westland, so that the decision to choose Sikorsky
could be seen as belonging to Cuckney and his shareholders,
not Margaret Thatcher.
If political pressures from the United States were a
concern, it did not become public. While it is true that
76 Freedman, p. 3.
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Westland first signed a deal with Sikorsky in 1946 and
relations between the two companies were good, top level
government personnel were not directly involved.
Thatcher's political pressure came from within her
government. "For the British Government now to acquiesce in an
American helicopter company taking what might be thought by
the European companies to be virtually a controlling stake in
the only British manufacturer would have been contrary to the
spirit of the 1978 declaration [of principles]." 7 Contrary
or not, Margaret Thatcher proceeded to accept a U.S. rescue
bid for her failing helicopter industry.
D. MILITARY FACTORS
014 What was the equipment to be used for?
The Westland affair did not involve any equipment that had
been ordered for a specific mission within the realm of the
United Kingdom's defence, unlike the following two cases. The
Westland Affair concerned an entire helicopter manufacturer.
Helicopters can have a variety of missions. In the United
Kingdom, helicopter buying was prone to inter-service
squabbles. The Army, Navy, and Royal Air Force all operated
them. Helicopter's had no one backer to give them bureaucratic
clout.
HCDC, "Government's Decision-Making," para. 42.
78 Linklater and Leigh, p. 34.
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When Westland's financial troubles became known, the
company was nearing the end of its production run of the Sea
King helicopter; and time was coming when it would become
necessary to replace their production. Knowing this, the
company made a bold decision to venture into a civilian
helicopter program, referred to as the W30 (as discussed in
question 5.)
Westland's WS70, the renamed Black Hawk design, as a
result of the Sikorsky deal, was used for training and market
support activities. WS70s mission was not vital for securing
the United Kingdom's defence. Rather, it was critical to
Westland's very existence in defence industry.
015 Did military strategy (keeping control of essential
defence reguirements) preclude US/European collaboration?
A simple answer to this question is no. Military strategy
had less to do with Westland's acceptance of an outside source
to salvage its company than economics.
National procurement, had it been financially possible,
would no doubt have been preferable to the United Kingdom's
defence industry. This was not the case. The government got
involved. Saving Westland i.e. the United Kingdom's only
helicopter company, was a matter of prestige, not military
strategy.
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E. SUMMARY OF CASE
The public and private face of the Westland affair
represented two different aspects of the Thatcher
Administration. Publicly, the British government stressed that
"the Board of Westland had the right and responsibility to
make and defend its decision whether to associate with UTC-
Sikorsky or the European consortium."9
Privately, the government ensured that the company was
rescued, and rescued by an American firm. In one final
analysis, the Westland affair "shed an uncomfortable light not
only on the way the Government machine in the United Kingdom
can be run, but how it can be used to stifle dissent and
ensure that secret decisions and secret motives are
protected.
"s
Table 2.4 illustrates eiacY. of the explanatory variables in
terms of how each of them contributed to the Government's
decision. Each factor is rated as Important, Marginal, or Not
Important.
CMD 9916, para. 26.
so Linklater and Leigh, p. 4.
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TABLE 2.4 RATING THE FACTORS




Q7 Tech Transfer X
Q8 Industry(Econ) X
Q9 Economic ruin X
Q10 Govt policy X
Q11 PM involved X
Q12 Detente X
Q13 NATO/US rels. X
Q14 Equipment X
Q15 Mil. Strategy X
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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III. NATO FRIGATE REPLACEMENT 90
"The cases selected-NATO Hawk, NATO Sea-Sparrow...and
NATO Frigate ReDlacement-have not been selected because
they were better than other cases but simply because they
have been successful-y NATO standards-for a variety of
different reasons." [Excerpt from a study of
"successful" cases of cooperative armaments programs.]
"Spain's withdrawal late last month [December, 1989] from
the effort to develop a standard frigate class for the
1990s (NFR-90) was the shot that finally sunk NATO's
largest cooperative project."
The NFR-90 programme was prematurely terminated. Why? What
happened to NATO's potentially first 'cradle-to-grave'
cooperative project? Some clues emerge as the next fifteen
questions, regarding the cancellation of the NATO Frigate
Replacement programme are answered.
01 Who participated in the project?
Following a 1981 pre-feasibility study, the NATO Frigate
Replacement program originally consisted of seven nations.
Those nations were: the United Kingdom, Canada, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the
81 Kelly Campbell, Military Systems Acquisition In The
NATO Market, New York: Frost and Sullivan, Inc., 1985, p. 131.
Theresa Hitchens, "Spain Sinks NFR-90 Hopes," Defense
News, Vol. 5 No. 2, 8 January 1990, p. 1.
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United States. Spain joined the program a short time later.
Table 3.1 shows the distribution of frigate orders anticipated
in 1984.
TABLE 3.1: 1984 NFR-90 ORDERS
---- -------------------------------------------------------










(Source: Ted Hooton, "NFR 90 NATO's next-generation frigate?,"
International Defense Review, 4/198 8 ,p.4 09 .)
02 What impact did the project have on the defence budgets
in terms of magnitude?
The main rationale for the eight nations to proceed with
a joint frigate program was "the economies of scale obtainable
from international collaboration." Given that the project
was spread among eight nations, NFR-90 was anticipated to
absorb a smaller percentage of national defence budgets than
"The NATO FRIGATE," NATO'S Sixteen Nations, Vol. 28
No. 2, April-May 1983, p. 84.
W.T.T. Pakenham, RN, CAPT, (Rtd), "The NATO Frigate
Project-A View from British Industry," Naval Forces, Vol. X
No. V, 1989, p. 35.
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if each had chosen to go it alone. Savings were estimated at
25%. 8
The industries and defence contractors involved were many.
The pre-feasibility study involved 90 companies and 150
engineers and cost the United Kingdom $7 million. The 1984
feasibility study alone cost an estimated $15 million and
involved the participation of the following "lead" companies:
Acres International Ltd of Canada, Thomson-CSF of France, MTG
Marinetechnik GmbH of the FRG, Cantieri Navali Italiani of
Italy, Hollandse Signaal Apparaten BV of The Netherlands,
Empresa Nacional Bazan of Spain, British Shipbuilders, and
Westinghouse Corporation of the United States.87 The costs
were considerable. By 1989 it had become necessary to increase
the budget or make a smaller, less capable ship. The
preliminary figure of $30 billion for 52 ships was expected to
rise unless the participants would agree to scale back
operational requirements. The United Kingdom's defence
budget had been decreasing since 1985 and was virtually static
in 1990 at $33.8 billion--a decrease of 0.6% from 1989's
85 Campbell, p. 147.
"U.K. Leaves NFR-90 NATO Frigate Program, Future in
Doubt," Aerospace Daily, 3 October 1989, p. 11.
8 John Llewellyn, "The NATO Frigate Replacement,"
Naval Forces, Vol. VII No. 1, 1986, p. 25.
88 Giovanni De Briganti and Theresa Hitchens, "NATO
Frigate Plan Faces Dilemma: Build Smaller Ship or Raise
Budget," Defense News, Vol. 4 No. 37, 18 September 1989, p. 4.
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budget. The United Kingdom could no longer afford to
continue participating.
By the time the United Kingdom withdrew from the project
in September 1989, costs were given as one of the reasons. "A
decision on whether to join the two-year $82 million project
definition stage was..[the] deadline which triggered the U.K.
withdrawal."9 Comparative costings showed a 70 million pound
difference between a Type 23 Frigate for the Royal Navy (at
130M) and the NFR-90 (at 200M).
9 1
Upon withdrawing from NFR-90, the United Kingdom awarded
a follow-on contract to Swan Hunter for three Type 23
frigates, at an estimated cost of 500 million dollars. (The
United Kingdom was supposed to purchase 12 NFR-90s, second
only to the United States' order of 18.) The new contract was
92
expected to create 10,000 jobs over five years.
The NFR-90 had a substantial impact on the United
Kingdom's defence budget and her decision to withdraw
prematurely. Twelve ships at an estimated cost of $308M each
89 , "UK defence budget almost static at
21.2 B," Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 November 1989, p. 1133.
"U.K. Leaves..," p. 11.
91 "NFR-90's future in doubt," Defence, Vol. 20 No.
11, November 1989, p. 840.
92 Francis Tusa, "In Wake of NFR-90 Withdrawal, UK
Lines Up Frigate Contracts," Armed Forces Journal
International, February 1990, p. 41.
45
would have eaten up the lion's share of the sea equipment
procurement allotment of any given year.93
03 What types and levels of technology were utilized?
The NFR-90 would have incorporated a variety of
technologies and levels. The three principal subsystems
included: the hull and machinery, electronics, and weapons.
A substantial amount of new technology was to be used in the
NATO frigate, beginning with state-of-the-art computer
technology. A new computer technology with a "distributed
architecture" was to have used mini and micro computers
connected together in a network.9
In addition, NFR-90 was designed to utilize a new missile
system, NATO Antiair Warfare System, NAAWS or Family of Air
Missiles, FAMS. The choice between the two became the crux of
the project's troubles. On the one hand was the US-led NATO
Antiair Warfare System (NAAWS). On the other hand was the
European-led Family of Air Missiles (FAMS).
93 David Fouquet, "NFR-90 Project Rocked by UK
Pullout," Armed Forces Journal International, November 1989,
p. 36.
94 "Nine British Companies in Joint Bid for New NATO
Frigate," Defence, Vol. 18 No. 11, November 1987, p. 664.
Roger L. Schaffer, P.E. and Harvey G. Kloehn, P.E.,
"Design of the NFR-90," Westinghouse, February 1990, p. 23.
This document was made available to me by Mr. Harvey Kloehn,
chief engineer of the NATO Frigate Program, who worked in
Hamburg, Germany for Westinghouse.
"NFR 90: the pains of collaboration," Jane's
Defence Weekly, 14 October 1989, p. 783.
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Countries supporting NAAWS included France, Italy, The
Netherlands, Spain, UK and US. FAMS gained support from
France, Italy, Spain and the UK.97 Before the project was
cancelled, France and Italy withdrew from NFR-90 which
effectively killed FAMS as a possibility for a NATO-wide
programme for the NFR-90.
In all, thirty major procurement areas were under project
control. Costs were to be shared with national industries to
ensure that "A2 nation in the project would have a national
trade imbalance by participating."9
Further information regarding technologies to have been
utilized in the frigate can be found throughout the
Westinghouse document, "Design of the NFR-90."
04 Which option was chosen and what were the specific
arrangements: I)UK, 2UK/US, 3)UK/EUROPE or 4)UK/Europe and
US?
Had the NFR-90 continued through completion, it would have
been a truly international collaborative effort involving much
of Western Europe and the United States. Instead, as seen in
question 2, the United Kingdom lowered its order from 12 to 3
frigates and awarded a contract for a national design to Swan
Hunter, thereby selecting a national solution.
97 Industries within the United Kingdom and Spain
worked on both systems.
Schaffer and Kloehn, p. 4 1.
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The argument made public at the time of the United
Kingdom's withdrawal from the program was that the design had
progressed far enough for the "Government to be sure that it
would not meet national requirements." Moreover, at the
time of the United Kingdom's withdrawal, it emerged that "the
United States Navy's commitment to the programme may only
[have been] a paper one.,, 10
The US, Canada and The Netherlands agreed to continue the
NAAWS project, but in the case of the frigate program, "the
three countries determined that a trilateral effort was not
profitable.,, 101
Since most of the European NFR-90 members still need new
frigates "they expect new national, bilateral or multilateral
development projects to emerge.." In March 1990, Yarrow
Shipbuilders Ltd., a subsidiary of the United Kingdom's
General Electric Co., proposed a new Super Frigate as an
alternative to the defunct NFR-90. Two other informal European
proposals have also been launched: a joint venture between the
Norman Friedman, "Fall-out from the NATO Frigate,"
Proceedings, March 1990, p. 172.
100 Barbara Starr, "NFR 90: USN 'had no official
interest'," Jane's Defence Weekly, 14 October 1989, p. 762.
101 Hitchens, p. 37.
102 Ibid.
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Germans and the Dutch and a French proposal to involve the
Italians, Spanish and British defence ministries.
10
Initially it seems that what happened to the NATO Frigate
programme was a lack of financial commitment by the United
Kingdom and disagreement among the partners about which
missile system to use. In addition, the ship's design did not
meet the United Kingdom's needs. We turn now to other factors
which can help to further explain why the NATO frigate sank.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
05 Was the United Kingdom's defence industry self-
sufficient in terms of technology needed?
The United Kingdom has long been known for its
shipbuilding capability, but the industry had been hit by
defence spending cuts in recent years. The 1990 defence budget
called for a 16% cut (8 ships) in the Royal Navy's
destroyer/frigate force.
1 04
The United Kingdom's entry into the collaborative frigate
programme, in addition to being an economical consideration,
was based on the opportunity to expand its technological
ability. The same is held for the ship's intended missile
system.
103 Michael J. Witt, "Scottish Shipbuilder Floats
Latest Design Alternative to Supply NATO's New Frigate,"
Defense News, March 12, 1990, p. 4.
104 "Britain The peace prospectus," The Economist,
July 28, 1990, p. 47.
49
A survey of Jane's Fighting Ships shows that the United
Kingdom is capable of building frigates comparable to many
nations. Swan Hunter is currently building three "Duke" class
Type 23 frigates for service in the Royal fleet.
06 Was arms exportation of said eguipment a factor in
partners chosen/not chosen?
Early evidence in the case suggested that the issue of
exportation was of a delicate nature and had remained muted.
However, the idea of exporting the NFR-90 to non-NATO nations
undoubtedly offered possibilities. 105
While it is true that reasons other than exportation
possibilities were given as the driving force behind the
frigate project, the United Kingdom relies heavily on exports.
In particular, British naval exports have done especially well
in recent years--'they account for 15-20% of a total of about
$3-4 billion sold over the past year [1989]." 10
07 Did technology transfer enhance/detract from this
collaborative project?
In the early stages of the project, the secondary
motivation for participating was the opportunity for
technology exchange and improvement. The advantage of the
105 "The NATO Frigate," NATO'S Sixteen Nations,
Vol. 28 No. 2, April-May 1983, p. 84.
106 Norman Friedman, "Britain Cancels NATO
Frigate," Proceedings, December 1989, p. 124.
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large collaborative project was the "ability to aggressively
pursue technical innovation." °10 7
As previously discussed, the main attraction of the
project was the weapon system of the frigate, in which each
nation stood to gain from shared technologies.
Technology transfer became a detractor to the United
Kingdom whose industry "registered its 'serious concern'"
about US domination over the UK in fields of technology
concerned with the frigate. The UK's Chief of Defence
Procurement, Peter Levene, "feared that the USA might reap the
benefit of supplying much of the technology..without taking
any offsets."
109
In another interview, Mr. Levene indicated that the UK
would cut programmes if technical solutions did not
materialize."0  Technology transfer could have enhanced
collaboration had the project been completed.
107 Schaffer and Kloehn, p. 37.
108 "MOU ON NFR 90," Naval Forces, Vol. VIII No. VI,
1987, p. 101.
109 Desmond Wettern and Paul Beaver, "Concern over UK
involvement in NFR 90 programme," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol.
8 No. 11, 19 September 1987, p. 569.
110 Barbara Starr, "UK denies major policy shift...,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 October 1989, p. 883.
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B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
08 Was the United Kingdom's industrial capability
threatened if the project was not completed?
The United Kingdom's defence industry has been losing its
ability to remain self-sufficient. It has been warned that
certain towns totally dependent on Royal Navy dockyards could
"suffer permanently" if defence cuts continue at the projected
rate of 8-9% per year through the year 2000. The United
Kingdom's shipbuilding industry lost orders because of the
United Kingdom's withdrawal from the NFR-90 project. The
industry suffered from the project's cancellation, but is more
threatened by reduced defence spending levels which have been
forecasted through the 1990s.
The United Kingdom's defence industry was "disbarred from
providing equipment for NFR-90" because the UK did not
participate in the Project Definition phase. 12 UK industry
was "particularly concerned about the cost of the project
definition phase. " 113 Therefore the government's decision not
to participate in that phase was of little concern to the
defence industry.
"Counting the ploughshares," The Economist, June 2,
1990, p. 65.
112 "MOU ON..," p. 102.
113 ------- , "NFR 90 caught in tax law row," Jane's
Defence Weekly, Vol. 10 No. 19, 12 November 1988, p. 1189.
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An unidentified source has been quoted to the effect that
the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the frigate programme was
"a tragedy for British industry." 11  Other ministers
disagreed, saying there was "no point throwing good money
after bad." 115 The United Kingdom's industrial capability was
indirectly threatened by the frigate's cancellation, but more
directly so by shrinking defence budgets.
09 Was a decision made within a specified time--frame to
avoid an economic downturn?
Key decisions were continually being made throughout the
length of the United Kingdom's participation in the frigate
programme. Many of those decisions were made to avoid
overspending and quite possibly to avert economic disaster.
For example, early in 1987 the UK's Chief of Defence
Procurement advised the Government not to sign the Memorandum
of Understanding by 21 October 1987, but to delay entry into
the project until a later date so that the UK could "reap the
benefit of R&D by the other members of the project without
incurring a share of the costs."
116
When the UK finally signed the MOU in January of 1988, it
was on the condition that the project came under "fundamental
114 Giovanni De Briganti and Theresa Hitchens, "NATO
Frigate Project Sinks Under Withdrawals," Defense News, Vol.
4 No. 41, October 9, 1989, p. 66.
115 Ibid.
116 Wettern and Beaver, p. 569.
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scrutiny after a six month review period.." 117 The UK signed
for six months instead of the full two years agreed by the
other partners.
The UK, having provided itself an "out", was the first
nation to withdraw from the project on 29 September 1989.
Dissension had arisen between the participants over several
issues--costs being one of them.118 European observers
believed that the "soaring cost of the project [was) one of
the main reasons for the U.K. pullout."
119
Since it was never entirely clear that the expected
savings associated with the NFR-90 could be realized, it is
not difficult to believe that the UK pulled out to avoid
overspending on a frigate that was reputedly not in the United
Kingdom's national interest. In addition, the Royal Navy




010 Was the British defence industry guided by government
guidelines?
117 Pakenham, p. 40.
118 "UK pulls out of NFR-90," International Defense
Review, 10/1989, p. 1295.
119 "U.K. Leaves NFR-90 NATO Frigate Program, Future in
Doubt," Aerospace Daily, 3 October 1989, p. 11.
120 Friedman, "Britain Cancels..," p. 124.
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The Government relied on Levene's recommendations and
consequently followed them regarding the NFR-90. The NFR-90
was under the Value for Money programme.
The Government, encouraged by Levene and the Treasury
Department, held off signing the MOU, as we saw previously.
The decision to withdraw from the frigate programme "was made
at the Cabinet level." 121 "It was a cabinet-level decision
pushed by the Treasury and opposed by the Ministry of
Defence."1
011 Did the Prime Minister become involved?
Prime Minister Thatcher was involved in the decision to
cancel the United Kingdom's participation in the NATO frigate
program, but not to the extent that she showed in the Westland
case.
The "British decision to withdraw from the NFR-90 was
taken at the Government level, under pressure by the
Treasury."12 The project was handbagged by the British
treasury "implying the United Kingdom's withdrawal was
decided by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.." 124
121 Friedman, p. 172.
122 "NFR 90: the patient finally expired," Navy News &
Undersea Technology, February 5, 1990, p. 7.
123 "NFR-90 Shrinks," Military Technology, 11/89, p.
122.
124 De Briganti and Hitchens, "NATO Frigate Project
Sinks..," p. 66.
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As far as the NFR-90 went, it appears that the Prime
Minister followed the advice of her Ministers of Defence and
Treasury. This fact was collaborated by Captain Gordon Wilson,
Head of Defence Studies (Royal Navy), in an informal
conversation held at the Naval Postgraduate School on 7
November 1990.
012 Was detente an issue?
Detente was an issue throughout the life of the frigate
programme. In the frigate's initial stages, detente was in the
background. The navies involved progressed through the pre-
feasibility and feasibility studies with different ideas of
the threats to be countered because of differing operating
ocean environments.
125
As the project marched on, so too did the thaw in East-
West relations. Negotiations between the opposing pacts--NATO
and WTO, involving conventional forces in Europe (CFE), were
nearing completion by 18 November 1990. According to one
observer, the "changing atmosphere on collaborative programmes
was partly due to the possibility of an agreement with the
Soviet Union on conventional force reductions in Europe and
new agreements on confidence and security-building
measures. 
126
125 Pakenham, p. 40.
126 Starr, "UK denies..," p. 883.
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The anticipated "peace dividend" contributed to the
frigate's demise. In times of 'peace', "defence spending is
bound to be under constant critical scrutiny. .therefore the
estimated cost for the NATO Frigate project, is bound to be
uppermost in all minds."
127
013 How important were NATO/US relations in determining
the outcome?
For the United Kingdom, the decision to join the NATO
programme was a difficult one. "She [had] every need to enter
Europe fully..even if [it led] to short term loss.
"128
Arguments in the United Kingdom would be no different than
those in any other country namely that-- "industry and
employment must be safeguarded at whatever cost."
12 9
Ministries had the ambition to collaborate meaningfully
without success. Industry would have the chance to do what
unsuccessful ministries failed to achieve. Industry ultimately
needed the government's backing (and money) which ended in
1989.
If the NFR-90 was to have been successful, it would have
had to pass some demanding tests. For one thing, "there [had]
127 Wright, p. 44.
128 Roger Villar, "The NFR 90 Project NATO's Frigate,"
Navy International, Vol. 88 No. 6, June 1983, p. 352.
129 Ibid.
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to be a clear balance of advantage from each and every
national point of view." 130
The United Kingdom's "non-participation. .would undoubtedly
have serious ramifications on the future success of the
programme." 131 If the United Kingdom considered her partners
when she withdrew, it was not a matter of public knowledge.
"Politically, this chance of industrial co-operation
within Europe, assisting the creation of a European defence
industry matching that of America, would come to nothing."13
The French are said to have played a major political role
in the collapse of NFR-90 by pressuring her allies against the
"North American" program. The French lobbied against U.S.
participation in a European frigate program, but to little
avail. However, the French continued to pressure the Europeans
and are blamed by some for the frigate's demise.133
The French, incidentally, are not in the military
organization within NATO, despite their membership in the
Alliance. Consequently, when French warship designers saw the
130 Wright, p. 40.
131 "MOU.., p. 101.
132 Pakenham, p. 42.
133 Brendan McNally, "Industry Players Point To France
As Basic Reason Why NFR-90 Has Collapsed," Inside the Navy,
January 17, 1990, p. 1.
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NFR-90 design, they saw it "as a threat to their own
positions. 134
As for NATO's reaction, NATO's assistant secretary general
at that time, Mr. Mattingly, had this to say about the United
Kingdom's withdrawal--"maybe, it is, after all, worthwhile for
the British. They got something out of it; the valuable
knowledge that it's better to go their own way.,135
D. MILITARY FACTORS
014 What was the equipment to be used for?
Frigates are the backbone of most NATO navies. Originally
conceived for anti-submarine warfare missions, the NFR-90
concept gradually shifted emphasis to antiair operations.136
Each country had a different mission requirement which
meant that NFR-90 had to be designed around a flexible
platform. According to one study, there were seven categories
of mission requirements; 1) surveillance, 2) protection of
high value units, 3) protection of shipping, 4) area
operations, 5) support of amphibious operations, 6) non-combat
operations, and 7) self defence.137
Ibid.
135 De Briganti and Hitchens, "NATO Frigate Project..,"
p. 1.
136 Fouquet, p. 36.
137 Schaffer and Kloehn, p. 26.
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The principle objectives of the project were to: develop
a common ship and combat system design and maintain/improve
competitiveness of NATO industry.138 The frigate program got
off to a rocky start when the participating nations could not
agree on one single design. The solution was to build a
baseline design which could accommodate a number of national
variants. 139
Problems continued. For the United Kingdom, the mismatch
between the NFR-90 time scale and the immature AAW systems
caused critical inquiry and ultimate withdrawal. The ship's
role was also given as one reason why the United Kingdom
pulled out.14 The divergence between ASW and AAW contributed
to the frigate's failure. A common frigate design could not be
evolved to satisfy the broad requirements of the eight
nations.
015 Did military strateay (keeping control of essential
defence requirements) preclude US/European collaboration?
When the concept of the NATO frigate was born, the project
offered "the NATO navies opportunities that [were]
unobtainable through national programmes."141 The British
138 B.L. Harris, "Lessons Learned from the Premature
Termination of the Programme NATO Frigate for the 90's (NFR-
90)," letter from ISS Supervisory loard to Chairman of NIAG,
15 May 1990, p. 1.
139 Pakenham, p. 39.
140 "UK pulls out..," p. 1295.
141 Pakenham, p. 35.
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navy welcomed the NFR-90 on the theory it would be extremely
difficult for the government to abandon. Keeping control of
essential defence requirements was not such a concern. The
Royal Navy was willing to accept the new frigates as a less-
than-perfect compromise. (The Royal Navy needed ships to
replace their Type-42 area air-defense destroyers.)
When the government of the United Kingdom withdrew, the
Navy was shocked. Did this mean the government was unwilling
to spend enough to buy a good surface combatant or even a
"second-rate area defence ship..?" 142The UK Ministry of
Defence explained its decision to pull out by saying that
"NFR-90 was two years ahead of the British requirement."143
But the national requirement argument has been criticized as
a "convenient excuse." 
1
"
Military strategy did not preclude collaboration. British
industry and the Royal Navy stood to gain from the United
Kingdom's participation in the programme. "Lack of
understanding in the nations of what a potentially outstanding
ship NFR 90 (was] probably contributed to premature
termination. ,,145
142 Friedman, p. 124.
143 "NFR-90's future..," p. 840.
1"4 Friedman, p. 124.
145 B.L. Harris, p. 6.
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E. SUMMARY OF CASE
"International industry [was] unable to find any
substantive reasons, beyond the short term political and
economic interests of the participating nations, as to why the
NFR 90 programme was prematurely terminated." 1"
Table 3.2 illustrates each of the explanatory variables in
terms of how each of them contributed to the government's
decision. Each factor will be rated as Important, Marginal, or
Not Important
TABLE 3.2: RATING THE FACTORS
---- ------------------------------------------------------
Explanatory




Q7 Tech Transfer X
Q8 Industry(Econ) X
Q9 Econimc Ruin X
Q10 Govt policy X
Q11 PM involved X
Q12 Detente X






IV. EUROPEAN FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
"Even in early 1990, after three changes of name and
several changes of partners, the [EFA] project is not
completely secure."... "The UK has the 1gapacity, though
not the cash, to make EFA by itself,.."
Whether or not the European Fighter Aircraft will fly its
first flight in 1991 and begin series production in 1993 as
planned is unknown. Answers and observations to the following
fifteen questions can help in speculation about the chances or
success of the four-nation European Fighter Aircraft.
01 Who is Darticipating in the Droject?
When the combat aircraft target outline was drafted in
1983, France, West Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK were
signatories. France withdrew in 1985.
The national design teams are MBB, Aeritalia, CASA and
British Aerospace. As such, they are collaborating on
development and harmonization of the aircraft.148
In addition, the newly freed East European industries of
Czechoslovakia and Hungary are considering how and when to
147 Martin Bittleston, "Co-operation or Competition?
Defence Procurement Options for the 1990s," Adelphi Papers
250, IISS, London: Brassey's, 1990, p. 57 and p. 41.
148 Jane's Fighting Aircraft 1989, London: Jane's
Publishing Company, 1989, p. 121.
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approach the EFA consortium for subcontract work.1 49  Other
nations may contemplate participation in the months ahead.
Q2 What impact does the project have on the defence budget in
terms of magnitude?
The European Fighter Aircraft by all standards is expected
to be very expensive and to take a major slice out of the
defence budgets concerned. In 1985, when the United Kingdom's
Secretary of Defence envisaged the project, he predicted a 5
nation project which would produce 1,000 aircraft at a cost of
$35 billion.
The UK's 33% participation is estimated to cost 6-7
billion pounds, based on production beginning in 1991. To get
an idea how much the EFA compares to other defence
expenditures, a look at what participating nations spent in
1989 on weapons procurement, in US dollars, can put the
project in perspective. See Table 4.1 below.
TABLE 4.1: EFA MEMBER MAJOR WEAPON PROCUREMENT EXPENDITURE,










(Source: SIPRI, Armaments and Disarmament 1990, p.153 .
149 Laura E. Chatfield, "Czechs, Hungary Seek EFA
Business," Defense News, October 22, 1990, p. 3.
64
The United Kingdom spent 8,241M pounds or 43% of its 88-89
defence budget on equipment.150 In January 1989, 765 EFA's
would have cost between $31.9 and 37.1 billion.1 51 To
extrapolate, for the UK to purchase 150 EFAs based on an
average 1988 price of $23M, the cost would total $3.4 billion.
The European Fighter Aircraft has a hefty price tag. For
another example, the EFA is Germany's most expensive defence
expenditure.152 In October 1990, Italy's House Defence
Committee approved $490M in R&D funds for the EFA.153
03 Which type and level of technology are being utilized?
The European Fighter Aircraft will be comprised of
technology on all levels, with equal work shares in three
areas: 1) airframe, 2) engine, and 3) avionics (including
radar.) 1 4 "There is to be no trade-off between areas so as
to ensure a fair spread of technology to all the partners."155
150 HCDC, "The Procurement of Major Defence Equipment,"
Fifth Report, June 1988, p. v.
151 Keith Hartley and Nick Hooper," Economics: The
Ultimate Arms Controller?," NATO's Sixteen Nations, December
1988-January 1989, p. 35.
152 Michael J. Witt, "Report Says EFA Program in
'Serious Trouble'," Defense News, Vol. 5 No. 4, 22 January
1990, p. 41.
153 "Italians Vote for EFA Funds," Defense News, 22
October 1990, p. 2.
154 Frederick Bonnart, "The European Fighter Aircraft,"
NATO's Sixteen Nations, Dec. 85/Jan. 86, p. 60.
155 Ibid.
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Stealth technology will not be used to a high degree
because the Europeans do not have all the required technology.
The most important technology of the EFA is the radar for
which the "success of the entire programme could depend."
156
The radar is part of the avionics system which is said to
stretch current state-of-the-art to its limits.
157
Two consortia competed for the radar contract. The
Ferranti All-European led consortium offered the ECR 90, "a
system based on the Blue Vixen..under development for the Sea
Harrier."158 The Marconi Defence System was part of the West
German-led consortium which proposed the MSD 2000--based on
"the Hughes APG 65 radar fitted to the US F-18 Hornet."159
There was high level disagreement over the radar contract
with its multibillion dollar award--the largest among the EFA
systems. The cost of the radar amounted to 20% of the total
project, worth $2.38 billion.16 ECR 90 had strong backing
because of its all-European heritage.
156 HCDC Fifth Report, p. ix, para. 24.
157 A. Latham, "Conflict and Competition over the NATO
Defense Industrial Base; The Case of the European Fighter
Aircraft," in D.G. Haglund (ed), The Defense Industrial Base
and the West, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 95.
158 HCDC Fifth Report, p. ix, para. 24.
159 Ibid.
160 Giovanni De Briganti, "Beleaguered Ferranti Wins
EFA Radar Award," Defense News, Vol. 5 No. 5, 29 January 1990,
p. 4.
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Ferranti won the hotly contested radar contract, but not
until the government of the United Kingdom made two major
concessions. One, a guarantee to pay any future radar cost
overruns and two, an undisclosed industrial trade-off for
161raawol
Germany. U.S. defence contractors believed the radar would
be the test case for deciding if they would have a role in
EFA.
The airframe will utilize low detectability technologies
and will be built of composites materials, "using advanced
manufacturing techniques..,163
Contracts also include: 1) multifunction head-down
displays, 2) cockpit glare shields, 3) digital engine control
units, and 4) a range of engine components.
The European Fighter Aircraft offers a multitude of
technological requirements, from low levels to the highest
available within European industry.
04 Which option was/will be chosen: 1) UK, 2) UK/US. 3)
UK/Europe or 4) UK/Europe and US? and what are the specific
arrangements?
161 Ibid.
162 Gary Putka, "European Fighter Project's Rules May
Bar U.S. Firms' Participation," The Wall Street Journal, March
3, 1987, P. 36, Col. 1.
163 JANE's, p. 122.
164 Charles Miller, "U.K. 's Smiths to Develop Avionics
for EFA Program," Defense News, Vol. 5 No. 4, 22 January 1990,
p. 25.
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As of this writing, the United Kingdom and her European
partners are continuing with the EFA while "..the U.S. remains
largely excluded ... ,165
The United Kingdom reportedly was "not keen to give the
U.S. a capability to monitor advances in European radar
technology. "16 As a result, "the EFA is unquestioningly the
most sophisticated and technologically advanced aircraft yet
to be attempted by European industry."167
The work share arrangements, as established in 1984 and
the proposed number of aircraft ordered then, are provided in
Table 4.2.









(Source: "Fighter Aircraft 90," translated from Wehrtechnik,
Vol.16 No.5, May 1984,p.6.)
As the years have elapsed, the numbers of desired aircraft
have diminished. In 1988, the numbers had been reduced to 200
165 Trevor Taylor, "The European Fighter Aircraft,"
unpublished paper, 1989, p. 31.
166 Ibid., p. 24.
167 Latham, p. 95.
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for Germany, 150-200 for the UK, and 70-90 for Spain. 6 If
the numbers drop below the 400 mark, the project will be
economically unfeasible.
The Europeans have set out to develop and produce their
most sophisticated aircraft to date. Economical and political
considerations are building to the point that the partners are
proceeding although no outcome has been decided. The next set
of questions attempt to explain the EFA's future.
A. TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS
05 Is the United Kingdom's defence industry self-
sufficient in terms of technology needed?
British Aerospace is the UK's industrial representative on
the project and feels confident that the UK can proceed with
the EFA even if all the partners pull out. According to a
British Aerospace spokesman, "BAe is confident that the UK has
the complete technology potential to carry out the whole
project.. ,,169
British Aerospace (BAe) has a domestic monopoly as the
UK's single producer of major airframes and missiles. In 1979,
168 "European Fighter Project Partners Cool to U.S.
Hornet 2000 Proposal," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 28
March 1988, p. 22.
169 HCDC Fifth Report, p. 62.
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BAe was privatized, but not "in a way that would encourage
competition."' 
1 0
In fact, the Ministry of Defence has, for the first time
in several decades, "taken such pains to secure the technology
base for its next generation combat aircraft." 7'
06 Is arms exportation of said equipment a factor in
partners chosen/not chosen?
Yes. The importance of exportability to the Europeans has
meant considerable resistance to American participation in
EFA.172 "The new fighter is being designed to compete in
export markets against new generation fighter aircraft being
developed in the United States for the U.S. Air Force. "1 3
The government of the United Kingdom recognizes that
failure to keep pace will jeopardize market opportunities vis-
a-vis France and the United States.174 The European Fighter
Aircraft "demonstrates the importance of protectionism and
expanded sales markets to European competitiveness."1 5
70 Ron Smith, "Defence spending in the United
Kingdom," in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.) The
Economics of Defence Spending An International Survey, London
and New York: Routledge, 1990, p. 88.
171 Ibid., p. ix, para. 23.
Latham, p. 102.
173 Axel Krause, "European Fighter Project Competes
With U.S. Firms," Europe, March/April 1985, p. 16.
174 HCDC Fifth Report, p. lx.
175 Latham, p. 89.
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Since the EFA's exportability is of major importance,
problems arose regarding the radar to be used. "Worry over US
export controls restricting foreign EFA sales has been an
argument [against MSD-2000]."176 Accepting U.S. radar would
have meant that the U.S. could veto EFA exports.
The government of the United Kingdom "has been
particularly upset by U.S. export policy." The United
Kingdom and her European partners "view export sales as vital
for achieving adequate profits." 17
07 Did technology transfer enhance/detract from
US/European collaborative pyroects?
Technology transfer issues have detracted from the option
of U.S. collaboration. The four-nation consortium has resisted
U.S. technology controls in the multibillion dollar EFA
180program. All EFA contracts must certify that there are no
resale restrictions.
Technology, since it is tied to exports, is of crucial
significance to the European consortium. Consequently, the
consortium rejected France's attempt, in December 1985 to get
176 "Disagreement Between Britain, Germany Over Radar
Could Threaten EFA's Future," Aviation Week & Space
Technology, February 20, 1989, p. 21.
177 Taylor, p. 24.
178 Putka, p. 36.
179 Ibid.
180 Putka, p. 36.
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back into the project with a small 5% share, claiming problems
of technology transfer unless France became a full
181
partner.
The U.S. tried to get involved in the EFA at an early
stage, saying it was "prepared in principle to supply..the
technology necessary to produce an advanced..radar."182 The
letter stating that came from U.S. Secretary of Defense
Carlucci. However, the wording fell short of any clear
guarantees that would have satisfied the European doubts about
transfer issues. In addition, the last paragraph clouded the
issue of when the technology would have been available for
transfer.
Even before the Carlucci letter, previous U.S. Secretary
of Defense Caspar Weinberger had sent a letter which suggested
that "only that certain components and parts could be
manufactured in joint efforts with the United States in order
to make it more cost-effective.
"18
The European Fighter Aircraft is proceeding without U.S.
technology or participation at this time.
181 Bonnart, p. 61.
182 "Carlucci Letter Backs Supplying Radar Technology
for EFA," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 16, 1988, p.
28.
183 Bonnart, p. 62.
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B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
08 Is the United Kingdom's industrial capability
threatened if the project is not completed?
Yes. According to the government of the United Kingdom,
the European Fighter Aircraft project "is of vital importance
to the future of the British aerospace industry."184
EFA has massive industrial, economic and technological
implications. For these reasons, Europeans fear the idea of
buying American fighters because it would mean laying off
thousands and relinquishing competitiveness in military
aerospace. 185
The analysis of the feasibility Study showed that
"differences over requirements were less important than
industrial and political factors."186
Fighter aircraft make up the largest portion of the
aerospace market.The EFA, is a combat aircraft and therefore
belongs in this category. Development of the EFA and its
weapons systems to meet the world market requirements "provide
a major technological and competitive edge to the whole of the
British Aerospace industry.." 187
184 HCDC Fifth Report, p. viii.
185 Steven Greenhouse, "European Fighter: Cost vs.
Pride," The New York Times, February 21, 1989, p. D1 Col. 3.
186 Taylor, p. 7.
187 HCDC Fifth Report, p. 61.
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When asked about the implications of cancellation or
significant curtailment of the programme, British Aerospace
has said it would be difficult to estimate, but "presumably it
(could] be deduced from the above (paragraphs]."18
Cancellation would have a profound effect on the future
nature and structure of the European equipment industry, "such
is the commercial and technical importance of the EFA
.189
programme.'1
09 Will a decision be made within a specified time-frame
to avoid an economic downturn?
As the projected costs rise on the EFA, the probability of
nations pulling out is foremost in the minds of decision
makers involved in the programme. There is no denying that the
economic stakes are great. "What is driving EFA now is that
none of [the participants] at this point can afford to take
the political responsibility for pulling out, and that the
economic stakes for Europe are simply too great."19
Political considerations may be changing, but respect to
its aerospace industry, however, the United Kingdom seems
188 Ibid.
189 Ivan Yates, "Evolution of the New European Fighter
A British Industrial Perspective," British Aerospace
publication, 1988, p. 42.
Krause, p. 17.
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prepared, if need be, "to develop without partners--mainly due
to industrial-political considerations. " 191
C. SOCIO-POLITICAL FACTORS
010 Is the defence industry of the United Kingdom guided
by government guidelines?
As seen in the previous cha .- r, the government has set
policy with regards to creating a commercial approach to
defence procurement. The Value for Money program broke long
established practices to create a "new customer-supplier
relationship based on a strategy of greater commercial
awareness."1 92 The increase in commercial awareness is
designed to improve competition among defence contractors by
making them recognize that the government will no longer
accept the first proposals offered unless it is clear that the
best terms have been worked out.
Value for Money also places greater emphasis on best and
final offers by resisting cost-plus contracting. The Ministry
of Defence has applied the principles in EFA decision-making.
"Cabinet decisions with regard to Fighter Aircraft 90 with all
their consequences by far extend the meeting of purely
military demands. 193
191 "Fighter Aircraft 90," translated from Wehrtechnik,
Vol. 16 No. 5, May 1984, p. 4.
192 HCD%. Fifth Report, p. xxiv.
193 "Fighter Aircraft..," p. 4.
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0il Will the Prime Minister become involved?
Information regarding Margaret Thatcher's role in the
European Fighter Aircraft project is unavailable. UK industry
maintains their concern, however, that Her Majesty's
Government "in its anxiety to foster collaboration, may not
have pressed the British national interest as strongly as it
might,..
194
As decisions become more critical, the extent of Prime
Minister Thatcher's involvement would, had she been in power,
followed suit with past issues, and become deeper. It is not
known if Prime Minister Major will ensure that the EFA
continues to fly because of its importance to the future of
British Aerospace.
012 Is detente an issue?
Detente is very much an issue in the EFA programme and
might well contribute to its demise. A brokerage firm report
of January 1990 states that the multinational EFA program is
in serious trouble, mainly because certain NATO members are
scaling back defence spending commitments.195
The future of the European Fighter Aircraft programme has
been complicated by the changes in Eastern Europe. The
diminished threat perceptions coupled with CFE cuts will play
a role in the EFA's future.
194 HCDC Fifth Report, p. xxv.
Witt, p. 41.
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The EFA programme is being attacked for its cost and is
considered by many to be "an excessive investment to make at
a time when the Soviet threat is receding."19 On the other
hand, with the Soviet threat diminishing, the EFA looks better
since stealth technology is no longer necessary. There is also
export competition to consider. The EFA is not dead in spite
of the Cold War's end.
There is no question that detente is a major factor in the
EFA's future since the possibility of "continued detente could
further erode the EFA partners' readiness to spend large sums
on their own defense."197 If Britain's partners pull out, the
United Kingdom will have to decide whether to continue. If so,
the European Fighter Aircraft could become the British Fighter
Aircraft (BFA).
013 How important are NATO/US relations in determinina the
outcome?
The European Fighter Aircraft is a sore spot in US
relations with the United Kingdom and the other participating
NATO members. The Americans assert that EFA is "a case of
national pride clashing with economic sense."
198
The United States government has been unsuccessful in
lobbying for participation in the EFA program and believes
19 De Briganti, "Beleaguered 
... ," p. 46.
197 Taylor, p. 34.
198 Greenhouse, p. D-1.
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that economic competition drove the Europeans decision to
exclude US firms. The idea that national economic concerns
prevailed is thought to be a "disturbing trend throughout the
alliance." 199
The United States knew from the beginning that US
industries might be excluded from the project. "By the summer
of 1987 it seemed unlikely that the American efforts would
succeed in bringing about EFA's cancellation."
20
The Europeans' decision to develop and produce the fighter
aircraft without US participation was undoubtedly made after
considerable thought. Available information indicates that
despite the possibility of alienating the US, Europeans felt
obligated, for economic-industrial reasons, to "go it alone."
D. MILITARY FACTORS
014 What is the equipment to be used for?
The purpose of the European Fighter Aircraft is two-fold.
The first aim is to give NATO air forces a successor aircraft,
primarily configured for air defence, with a secondary
199 Tim Carrington, "Europe's Plan to Build New Fighter
Plane Puts Western Firms on Cutthroat Course," The Wall Street
Journal, May 23, 1988, p. 16 Col. 2.
200 Taylor, p. 14.
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capability for air-to-surface missions. Reportedly, the
UK's partners "only want an agile fighter."202
As the most important international collaborative
programme of the 1990s, EFA is also being developed to
"spearhead the technological and political-industrial defence
partnerships in Europe." 3 The aim of EFA is to be
instrumental in the creation of a European aerospace industry,
arguably the most important of the two-fold purpose for the
aircraft.
From the standpoint of industrial importance, the EFA's
production is a critical factor for creating an affordable
technology base to meet a perceived military threat.2'
015 Does military strategy (keeping control of essential
defence requirements) preclude US/EUROPEAN collaboration?
No. As with the Westland Case, the United Kingdom's
industrial capability is threatened if the EFA fails. The US
and other NATO allies have traditionally had similar defence
needs concerning Europe. In addition, the EFA is to be used by
NATO forces.
201 JANE's, p. 121.
202 Bittleston, p. 60.
203 Yates, p. 6.
204 Ibid.
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The United Kingdom had no need to keep control of defence
requirements other than from the standpoint of her defence
industry.
E. SUMMARY OF CASE
The status of the European Fighter Aircraft, as we have
seen, is far from secure, and is ongoing. Europe's defence
industry, particularly the United Kingdom's, has a lot to lose
if the project goes bust. Table 4.3 indicates the value of
each explanatory factor in relation to the decisions thus far
made.
TABLE 4.3: RATING THE VARIABLES




Q7 Tech Transfer X
Q8 Industry(Econ) X
Q9 Economic Ruin X
Q10 Govt policy X
QI PM involved X
Q12 Detente X
Q13 NATO/US Rels. X
Q14 Equipment X




A. SUMMARY OF CASES
Three cases were studied which involved three different
outcomes for the government of the United Kingdom. In the
Westland Case, the U.S. rescue bid was chosen instead of the
European offer. In the NFR-90 case, the United Kingdom started
the project with European allies and the United States in
1983. By the time of her withdrawal in September 1989, the
United Kingdom had decided on a national solution. In the
third and final case, the European Fighter Aircraft, the
United Kingdom is in partnership with three European allies,
having excluded the United States in the project's early
stages. If the Germans pull-out of the project, the United
Kingdom will most likely opt for a national solution. What,
then, did these case studies show concerning weapon
procurement in the United Kingdom and what can be concluded
about the future of defence procurement in the United Kingdom?
Table 5.1 combines the variable ratings from the previous
case summaries. It points out those factors that were
important in each case and those few key factors that were of
the same value (Important, Marginal or Not Important) in all
three cases.
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TABLE 5.1: RATING SUMARY





G6 Exports Westland NFR-90
EFA
G7 Tech Transfer Westland
NFR-90
EPA
Q8 Industry-Econ Westland NFR-90
EFA
Q9 Economic Ruin Westland EFA
NFR-90
Q10 Govt policy EFA Westland
NFR-90
Q11 PM Involved Westland NFR-90
EFA
Q12 Detente NFR -90
Q13 NATO/US Rels. Westland
NFR-90
EPA
Q14 Equipment NFR-90 Westland
EFA
Q15 Mil Strategy NFR-90 Westland
The factors that were the same in each case help in
generalizing how the decisions will be made in the future,
while other reasons need to be found for the multitude of
different factors that played a role in the United Kingdom's
defence decision-making process.
Table 5.1 shows that three variables had the same impact
in all three cases. First, in terms of technological self-
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sufficiency, the government of the United Kingdom's decisions
weighed heavily on making choices that would/will ensure
success for the nation's defence industrial base. In the
Westland case, the United Kingdom's chances of remaining self-
sufficient in helicopter manufacturing would most probably
have declined or disappeared had the company not been
financially rescued. Westland continues to produce
helicopters, but certainly not as numerous as in previous
times. However, without the instant monetary infusion from
United Technologies/Sikorsky in 1986 it seems likely that
Westland's future would have been anything but guaranteed.
Likewise, the United Kingdom's shipbuilding industry is
shrinking, so the NFR-90 programme offered a chance to
increase business. However, the United Kingdom was able to
pull out of the project without placing the defence industrial
base in real jeopardy. The United Kingdom is self-sufficient
enough in industrial terms to continue the European Fighter
Aircraft alone, if necessary. In fact, British Aerospace needs
the contract work. As the United Kingdom's sole airframe
producer, this technology must remain competitive.
In the three cases presented, the United Kingdom made
decisions based on saving, improving or maintaining a defence
industrial base with an emphasis on technological advances. As
Europe progresses toward its single integrated market and
competition opens up, this factor will play an even more
prominent role in the government's decision-making.
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Technology, or the acquisition of technology through
transfer, is another factor of major importance to the United
Kingdom. Government decisions were made in all three cases
which meant gains in technology for the short term--
immediately or within a few years (Westland, NFR-90) or kept
the United Kingdom and Europe's competitive edge by excluding
the United States as in the radar technology of the European
Fighter Aircraft. If the United Kingdom needed or desired
exportation of equipment, US export control policy was a
significant factor in the United Kingdom's decision not to
include US parts or participation.
A third variable, NATO/US relations and its impact on the
outcome, had a marginal value in each case. The United Kingdom
did not seriously consider her allies when making key
decisions in weapon procurement. All things being equal, the
United Kingdom would choose the partner(s) she stood to gain
the most from technologically and economically. The United
Kingdom's government showed more concern for its industry than
the larger scope of foreign relations.
The remaining eight variables show that in two out of
three cases, the variables had the same value, although those
values differed depending on the variable in question. For
example, Detente was an "Important" factor in both the NFR-90
and EFA cases, while of "No Importance" in the Westland case.
The United Kingdom could afford to ignore iecurity concerns.
Military Strategy was of "Marginal" value in the NFR-90 case,
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while of "No Importance" to Westland and EFA. What this means
for defence procurement is uncertain. Perhaps, given the
changing nature of the international environment--i.e.
dominated by detente, it means that the government of the
Jnited Kingdom has a series of considerations to contemplate
in all defence decision-making programmes. No longer will all
of the current weapons and missions remain necessary. Already
we have witnessed a reduction in the British Army on the Rhine
and fewer frigate purchases.
Another interesting aspect that Table 5.1 points out is
that of the remaining eleven variables that did not have the
same value, there were no variables that had a different value
per case. As an example, take the issue of exports. In the
Westland and EFA cases, exports were important, while of no
importance in the NFR-90 case. There were no variables in
which the value was Important in a case, Marginal in a case,
and Not Important in a case. Further research is necessary to
determine if there are other cases in which the variables
produce a unique value, rather than the two of three similar
values found in each of my variables. In this manner, if too
many variables produce a different value in each case, it
could become necessary to change the variables for ease in
making generalizations.
The three cases studied spanned the 1980s. Further
research could determine if similar results are found in cases
that were concluded in the 1960s and 1970s or if results can
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be duplicated in future British defence procurement choices.
Certainly, the state of the economy will play a role in
defence procurement. Before listing recommendations for
further research, it is necessary to address the limitations
of the research.
B. LIMITATIONS
As stated in the introduction, the independent variables
chosen were those that, at the time of the research design,
seemed satisfactory as questions that would help to explain
the outcomes of the three cases. Four areas were chosen in
which to utilize the variables, areas that were believed of
importance in determining how the British government made
defence procurement decisions. Those areas were: 1)
technological, 2) economical, 3) socio-political and 4)
military. All were useful and should be used for further
research.
Within each area, different variables could have been
used. It seems desirable to make changes based on the
limitations that were encountered in determining the impact of
technology transfer on the outcome of the cases. More
questions regarding US trade/export policy could deepen the
understanding of this barrier. In addition, in the area of
economics, it was difficult to gauge the impact of major
projects on the defence budget as a whole, given that projects
typically span many years, impacting jobs and industries as
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well as taking up their share of numerous defence budgets.
Question 9 which dealt with economic downturn was perhaps too
difficult a term to be realistically measured. In future
cases, it is recommended that economic hardship be evaluated
in terms of lost labor i.e. man hours and jobs. On any given
project, numerous companies are involved in the work.
Consequently, a breakdown of the companies' finances and share
of the project could help to clarify the extent of economic
hardship.
The questions that were more subjective in nature within
the socio-political area, were in many aspects easier to
answer. In the final area of military variables, factors need
to be examined more rigorously. Since weapons are acquired by
the armed services, it is critical to understand how much
impact each service has in requesting and designing equipment.
In addition, Question 15 regarding the impact of military
strategy on the decision, was the weakest because it suffered
from a poor definition. Distinguishing between military
strategy and military policy as important variables would be
beneficial to further research.
By far the area that was most limiting to the research was
the United Kingdom's government i.e.-- how British politicians
wield power, who holds that power, and which departments set
policy. Clearly, the United Kingdom's parliamentary system
differs significantly from the US system of government. As a
result, determining who controls the defence budget and
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acquisition process is critical. As was evident in the NFR-90
case, the Treasury wielded its substantial power and the
project was cancelled.
Government decision-making is further complicated by the
United Kingdom's Official Secrets Act which restricts certain
governmental information from public knowledge and access for
thirty years. When applicable, this limitation should be noted
at the outset in future research designs. In addition to
asking to what extent the Prime Minister was involved, future
research would be enhanced by including to what extent other
departments in the government were involved. Examples should
include the armed services, treasury and cabinet members.
Perhaps identifying the different political parties and their
platforms would also prove beneficial.
Finally, this writer was limited by inexperience in t:ying
to obtain British government documents. While it is true that
I was able to acquire many key documents eventually, a lesson
in how Stanford University's Green Library files such
documents would have improved my ability to obtain these items
more efficiently.
C. VARIABLES FOR OTHER CASES
There is no doubt that a multitude of variables could be
utilized in an attempt to further explore weapons procurement
and government decision-making in the United Kingdom. This
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section looks briefly at additional areas/concerns for
inclusion in future research.
As indicated in the previous section, more work needs to
be done regarding the United Kingdom's government structure.
No matter which country the United Kingdom chooses to
cooperate with on future weapon procurement projects, it is
vital to know how the British government functions i.e.--who
holds the power in any given situation. When, for example, is
a vote by parliament or the citizens of the United Kingdom
required? What is the difference between the political parties
vis-a-vis defence? Does it matter?
Another area of study should concern itself with the
budgetary process. How is the defence budget prepared? Is it
difficult or easy to adjust/alter? Who has the final approval?
Since major weapon acquisition is presumably a lengthy
process, how the British go about this process is necessary
information to know. If, for example, the budget for defence
is developed annually, how much in terms of percent, is set
aside for future projects? R&D?
The area of the United Kingdom's defence industrial base
and how this might intermingle with a European defence
industrial base, is an issue that will deserve much attention
as the single, integrated market comes into focus in 1992. A
study should be done which examines the differences between
groups such as the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), the
Western European Union (WEU), the National Armaments Directors
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(NAD) and other groups or organizations which could impact the
European defence industrial base and therefore future US joint
ventures. Particular emphasis should be placed on technology
transfer controls, the convergence of military and civilian
technology, the impact of EC92 on transatlantic business and
the fiscal pressure on defence budgets.
In the past, contradiction between words and deeds
occurred regarding allied technology cooperation. By
researching the pattern of successes and failures in weapon
procurement cooperative ventures between the United Kingdom,
the United States and Europe, one can more readily predict
what the future holds. The following section suggests case
studies which need further examination to unlock the key to
successful international collaborative programmes.
Before turning to those cases, it is necessary to comment
on the constant variables, those stated in the initial
research design as factors with a minimal role to the outcome
of each case. Of the seven constants given, one has changed
due to an unexpected switch in the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom effective November 27, 1990. Prime Minister
Thatcher resigned and was replaced by John Major, a
Conservative who previously held the job of Chancellor of the
Exchequer. He is the youngest man ever to hold the position of
Prime Minister and is a protege of Margaret Thatcher. In
future cases, this constant must become an independent
variable. Likewise, the Soviet Union and the United States
90
will not always be governed by Mikhail Gorbachev and George
Bush. Their successors will need to be examined, either as a
constant or independent variable since the political structure
of these societies has an impact on defence procurement.
D. CASES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
One US/UK collaborative program which was recently
cancelled that was brought to my attention by Mr. Lester
Taylor of Naval Surface Warfare Center was the Advanced Sea
Mine (ASM). 20 It was worked on for nearly two years and
close to production when the British withdrew.2M This case
is made even more interesting by a sister program still being
worked on by both teams stationed in the United States. (The
other team was headquartered in England.) Research needs to be
focused on the technology involved and the organizational set
up in order to determine why the program in the United Kingdom
was cancelled while a similar program is on-going in the
United States.
The United Kingdom has had extensive experience with
collaborative projects, dating back to the 1940s when British
205 Mr. Taylor and I had a conversation regarding his
work on this joint Anglo-American program while he was in
Monterey to attend a conference at the Naval Postgraduate
School.
206 See F. Fineran, W. King, T. Ryczek, D. Ference and
L. Taylor's "Advanced Sea Mine Final Report," Naval Surface
Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia, 1 June 1989 for more
information.
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scientists began work on the Manhattan project with US
partners, before the US government decided to withhold
information from the British. Study in this case could bring
to light UK/US nuclear relations and how they have progressed
to the Trident D-5 programme of today.
Other projects that the United Kingdom has been a partner
to include: the Concorde, the Airbus and the Jaguar and
Tornado strike fighters. The Tornado programme was successful
and some of the lessons learned from it have been used in the
European Fighter Aircraft project.
The United Kingdom is currently involved in a joint
project with Italy, the Anglo-Italian EH-101 helicopter
program, a program which one critic believes the British
government is unlikely to withdraw from. 07 If this turns out
to be the case, one has to ask why the program was successful.
This program deserves further attention.
Undoubtedly there are numerous examples of successful and
unsuccessful projects in which the United Kingdom bilaterally
or multilaterally cooperated with US and/or European partners.
Research needs to be carried on using the same variables
chosen in this thesis to prove or disprove my conclusions
which are featured below.
207 Friedman, p. 172.
92
E. FORECASTING THE FUTURE
Despite Western perceptions of a greatly diminished Soviet
threat, development of defence technology will continue.
Factors such as the uncertainty over the future evolution of
the Soviet Union, the spread of high-technology throughout the
Third World and concerns over national technological
competitiveness will play a part in collaboration and
cooperation among the allies. This does not mean joint
projects will flourish. Each of the NATO nations is concerned
with maintaining its perceived technological advantages and
levels of employment.20
The desire for national autonomy with respect to the
development and production of major weapon systems has been a
sensitive issue as this thesis has shown. However, "the UK
will continue to review its participation in international
cooperative arms programmes."209
The United Kingdom, like other NATO countries, is being
forced to cut back on defence spending. Coupled with a decline
in the threat and domestic economic burdens, the UK is faced
with political problems. After eleven years in power, Prime
Minister Thatcher was challenged by her ex-Defence Minister,
208 Jean-Francois Delpech, "Allied Technology
Cooperation Falters," Defense News, Monday October 22, 1990,
p. 19.
209 Barbara Starr, "UK denies major policy shift..,"
Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 October 1989, p. 883.
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Michael Heseltine: and as a result of these political
problems, "wider political and economic considerations will
thus enter into major decisions about the buying of defence
equipment; whether to buy from the UK or from overseas;.." 210
As the British government pays closer attention to
political considerations, perhaps large collaborative
programmes will have more chances of success if the programmes
are constituted to achieve "political and economic objectives
rather than specific military ones only." 211
There can be no question that the United Kingdom's
Ministry of Defence plays a big role in major weapon
procurement. Consequently, the "Ministry of Defence has
signified a greater willingness to purchase equipment from
overseas sources provided that cost, performance and timescale
,212advantages outweigh benefits of a domestic purchase."
The Ministry of Defence's future is going to be tied up
with government decisions since "government decisions
affecting defence are material to the future policy and
expenditure of the M o D."213 It is therefore imperative that
further research makes clear the structure of the United
Kingdom's government.
210 HCDC Fifth Report, p. v.
211 B.L. Harris, p. 2.
212 HCDC Fifth Report, p. xxv.
213 HCDC Fourth Report, p. vi.
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The future success of joint collaboration on major weapons
procurement depends on many factors, including the role of
technology, economics, industry and politics. Technology was
the most important variable in the three cases studied within
this thesis and will continue to be of major importance in
future procurement decision-making.
The United Kingdom's defence industry faces a tough
challenge in the future. The defence industrial base must
remain competitive whether this involves more collaboration
with the United States or Europe. The British government, no
matter which political party runs it, will make decisions
based on keeping the defence industry afloat. If Michael
Heseltine, who is pro-European, as witnessed in the Westland
Affair, had won the race for Prime Minister role in the United
Kingdom in the general election that must be held before mid
1992, we could have expected to see less and less cooperation
with the United States.
Prime Minister Major's policies are relatively unknown.
However, he does stand for a strong defence of British
interests in the European community and reportedly is likely
to continue Thatcher's policies--foreign, domestic, and
economic.214 Whether he will favor the Continent to the
United States in matters of defence can only be speculated
214 Craig R. Whitney, "Finance Official Beats 2 Rivals
in Tory Vote," The New York Times, 28 November 1990, p. Al,
Col. 5.
95
about. He has been labelled as pro-European and a strong
supporter of the special relationship across the Atlantic.
Nothing is certain as the future looms large in the face
of many unknowns. However, if for no other reason than
providing military products and technology at a price that
governments can afford, defence industries on both sides of
the Atlantic should continue to cooperate.215
215 Krause, p. 17.
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